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Abstract
The most polarizing statute regulating the internet is § 230
of the Communications Decency Act. Critics of § 230 do not like
that the statute provides broad immunity to website operators
when third parties post on their sites, while advocates for § 230
market the statute as promoting free speech on the internet and
preventing website operators from being subject to endless
liability. Critics view the statute as the sole problem, and the
advocates view § 230 as the savior for these website operators.
But the problem of hate speech and hurtful content online is
immense and requires expensive investment by these companies
to mitigate misinformation and harmful content. We need to
incentivize companies to invest in content moderation, tools, and
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personnel that will flag and remove dangerous content while
being careful to not scare these companies with potentially
endless liability and overwhelming costs. With so many tech
companies struggling to achieve profitability, the solution lies in
making content moderation less expensive in the short-term.
Website operators should get a tax credit in the short-term to help
bear the brunt of initial investments into content moderation.
Once website operators have established artificial intelligence to
flag and remove dangerous content, they will become less reliant
on the tax credit, as they have established the essential assets
needed to mitigate dangerous speech on their platforms. If
companies are incentivized to invest in content moderation,
rather than being scared with the potential of endless liability,
we will be closer to achieving our goal of creating safer platforms
for internet speech.
I.

BACKGROUND

On April 25, 1995, an individual posted t-shirts on an online
webpage that referred to the bombing of a federal building in
Oklahoma City.1 The individual said in the online post that
people interested in purchasing the t-shirts should call Ken
Zeran, and included Zeran’s phone number.2 As a result of this
prank, Zeran received a high number of derogatory messages
and death threats.3
The same post was made again on April 26, 1995, and
“interested buyers were told to call Zeran’s phone number . . .
and ‘please call back if busy’ due to high demand.”4 By April 30,
1995, Zeran received a violent phone call approximately every
two minutes.5 During this time period, Zeran notified America
Online, Inc. (“AOL”), the owner of the website the post was
written on, of the contents and extremities of the post. AOL did
not take down the post.6
Can Zeran bring a successful lawsuit against AOL, the
website operator, for defamatory speech of a third-party on
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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AOL’s webpage?7 No, Zeran cannot.8 The reason that Zeran and
other victims of online defamatory statements cannot bring
successful lawsuits against website operators is because of § 230
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).9 “[Section] 230
creates a federal immunity” to claims that try to make website
operators “liable for information originating with a third-party
user of the service.”10
II. CONGRESS’ INTENT IN ENACTING § 230
Congress enacted § 230 of the CDA on February 8, 1996.11
The statute states, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content
provider.”12 The term “interactive computer services” includes
“anything from web hosts to websites to social media
companies.”13 To analyze the statute by elements, § 230(c)(1)
protects liability for “(1) a provider or user of an interactive
computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat . . . as a
publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another
information content provider.”14
Congress’ intentions for § 230 were, inter alia, to “promote
the continued development of the Internet,” to preserve “the
competitive free market that” exists for internet and computer
services companies, and to “maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who
use the Internet and other interactive computer services.”15
Congress also enacted § 230 in response to court cases that

7. See id.
8. See id. at 330–35.
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
10. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
11. Id. at 334; see 47 U.S.C. § 230.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
13. Matt Laslo, The Fight Over Section 230–and the Internet as We Know
It, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2019, 3:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-oversection-230-internet-as-we-know-it/; see also Fair Hous. Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 n.6 (9th Cir.
2008) (“Today, the most common interactive computer services are websites.”).
14. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009); Fields
v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
15. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(3).
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held website operators liable for “defamatory statements” posted
by third parties on website operators’ message boards.16 For
example, in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Company, an
unidentified user of Prodigy’s internet bulletin board titled
“Money Talk” wrote a comment alleging that Stratton Oakmont
and its President at the time committed “criminal and
fraudulent acts in connection with the initial public offering of .
. . Solomon-Page Ltd.”17 The New York Supreme Court
determined that Prodigy controlled the content of its computer
bulletin boards, as they had the technology to “delete notes from
its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and
‘bad taste.’”18 The court concluded that Prodigy was liable for
defamation committed by its users.19
According to Congress, § 230 has spurred significant
advances for internet and computer services companies in “the
availability of educational and informational resources to our
citizens.”20 Internet users have “a great deal of control over the
information they receive,” and people are relying on “interactive
media for . . . political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.”21 The internet and interactive computer services offer
a forum of discussion for political, educational, cultural, and
entertainment matters.22
Section 230 has helped shape the internet into the
influential and valuable product it now is. It has helped promote
the free expression of different cultural views.23 The statute is
16. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016); see also
Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2009)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 208) (“One of the specific purposes of [§ 230] is to overrule
Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated [Internet service] providers and users as publishers or speakers of
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to
objectionable material.”); Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No.
31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
17. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1–2.
18. Id. at *10.
19. Id. at *13–14.
20. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2), (5).
22. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
23. See Felix Gillette, Section 230 Was Supposed to Make the Internet a
Better Place. It Failed, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 7, 2019, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-08-07/section-230-wassupposed-to-make-the-internet-a-better-place-it-failed.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/7

4

2020

SUPPLEMENTING SECTION 230

285

vital to the internet because it gives companies “broad leeway to
moderate discussions” in a manner that is best suited for their
company.24 This has allowed website operators to host a large
array of “user-generated content,” which spurred the rise of the
social media industry and information platforms like Google and
YouTube.25 Felix Gillette emphasized the importance of § 230 to
the internet when he stated, “[i]t’s no hyperbole to call Section
230 the foundation on which the modern internet was built.”26
Section 230 was intended to promote the growth of internet
companies, while protecting them from defamatory statements
The courts have
of third-party users on their sites.27
emphatically protected § 230’s legislative intent to incentivize
website operators to self-police the internet for obscene and
offensive content, which has resulted in courts “almost always”
granting immunity to website operators.28
III. HOW COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED § 230
The United States Supreme Court has not taken up a case
concerning how courts should interpret § 230.29 Courts have
construed § 230 broadly because website operators that display
third-party content can have an “infinite number of users
generating an enormous amount of potentially harmful
content.”30 If website operators were held liable for all harmful
24. Felix Gillette, The Little Law That Made the Internet a Free for All,
WASH.
POST
(May
29,
2020,
3:19
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/the-little-law-that-made-theinternet-a-free-for-all/2020/05/28/b02270e2-a0ed-11ea-be06af5514ee0385story.html.
25. Id.
26. Gillette, supra note 24; cf. Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v.
Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 491 (2004) (arguing that “the Internet is no longer
in its infancy,” and therefore § 230 needs to be modified).
27. See Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2016); 47
U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
28. See Patricia Spiccia, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be
Earned and Not Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 386 (2013); Blumenthal
v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998).
29. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). This was the only case the
Supreme Court has addressed concerning the CDA, but it has not addressed §
230 of the CDA.
30. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 18–19 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
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content on their sites, it would impose too great a burden on
website operators to screen every post made on their site.31
Courts have commonly held that “internet service providers,
website exchange systems, online message boards, and search
engines” fall within the “interactive computer service[s]” that §
230 intends to protect.32
When interpreting the plain language of § 230, the statute
creates a broad immunity against “any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service.”33 Plaintiffs who bring
lawsuits against website operators under § 230(c)(1) usually
bring claims of defamation, negligence, or intentional infliction
of emotional distress against the website operator.34 Congress
expanded § 230 protection for website operators against state
and local laws under § 230(e)(3) which says “[n]o cause of action
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”35 The
ultimate question courts consider in analyzing § 230(c)(1) as a
defense is whether the website operator is to be considered a
“speaker” of the content that is at issue, or whether the website
operator is a “publisher” exercising its traditional publisher

129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v.
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that “the difficulty of
separating lawful from unlawful speech, and the relative lack of incentives to
protect lawful speech,” are why the courts should “broadly construe” Section
230 immunity); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th
Cir. 2003) (describing the § 230(c) immunity as “quite robust”); Ben Ezra,
Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000)
(explaining that providing immunity to “publisher liability” is essential for a
company to exercise “editorial and self-regulatory functions” without endless
liability).
31. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 18–19 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331).
32. FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016).
33. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413,
418 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that § 230(c)(1) provides “broad immunity” to
website operators for “all claims stemming from their publication of
information created by third parties”).
34. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–03 (9th Cir. 2009).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3); see also Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler,
From the Digital to the Physical: Federal Limitations on Regulating Online
Marketplaces, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141, 176–77 (2019) (explaining that §
230(e)(3) provides a “preemption clause” with the intention to encourage state
laws targeted at internet companies). Otherwise, Congress would have just
relied on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/7

6

2020

SUPPLEMENTING SECTION 230

287

functions.36 The use of the term “publisher” in § 230 indicates
Congress’ intention to “immunize service providers only from
publisher liability.”37
For the website operator to be the “speaker” of content, it
must “directly and ‘materially’ contribute[] to what made the
content itself ‘unlawful.’”38 Circuit courts have adopted a
distinction between “taking actions (traditional to publishers)
that are necessary to the display of unwelcome and actionable
content and, on the other hand, responsibility for what makes
the displayed content illegal or actionable.”39 A website operator
can also be considered a “developer” of the content of third
parties, which subjects the website operator to the same amount
of liability as the “speaker” of the content.40 The website
operator can be considered the “developer” of the third-party
content if it “encourages or advises users to provide the specific
actionable content” that brings about the lawsuit.41
In FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit concluded that LeadClick “developed” the
third parties’ content by giving instructions to the third parties
on how to use false advertising that encouraged consumers to
purchase the third parties’ weight-loss products.42 In Fair
Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, the defendant website
operator developed questions, answers, and a search mechanism
that encouraged discrimination in the way people can search for
roommates.43 The decisions in LeadClick and Roommates.com
36. See Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 19 (citing Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101–
02).
37. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332.
38. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 68 (2d Cir. 2019).
39. Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 414 (6th Cir.
2014); see Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 2016); Fair Hous.
Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1169–74 (9th Cir. 2008).
40. Force, 934 F.3d at 68; 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (“The term ‘information
content provider’ means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in
part, for the creation or development of information provided . . .”).
41. Force, 934 F.3d at 69; see FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158,
176 (2d Cir. 2016); Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1172.
42. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d at 176–77; see also Force, 934 F.3d
at 69 (“LeadClick’s suggestions included adjusting weight-loss claims and
providing legitimate-appearing news endorsements, [which] materially
contribut[ed] to [the content’s] alleged unlawfulness.”).
43. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1165–68, 1172. Roomates.com
required users to provide protected characteristics, and the website hid some
listings depending on the submissions. Id. at 1167.
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have opened up a slim path for plaintiffs to avoid § 230 barring
their claim.44 An “interactive computer service” may apply § 230
protection “only with respect to ‘information provided by another
But if the “interactive
information content provider.’”45
computer service” is also an “information content provider,” then
the website operator is “not immune from liability arising from
publication of that content.”46
Parties who claim harm by a website operator’s publication
of third-party content still have a source of recourse if the
“interactive computer service” is not also the “information
content provider.”47 The party may sue the third-party user that
generated the content, but not the website operator that enabled
the third-party to publish the content online.48 Plaintiffs are
hesitant to pursue a claim against the speaker of the content
because the speaker may not have the financial resources to pay
damages, and the identity of the speaker may not be readily
apparent.
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, it is rare to find an interactive
computer service that is also an information content provider.
This leads to the dismissal of most § 230 cases.49 If the website
operator is considered to be exercising its traditional publisher
functions, the website operator is afforded immunity for the
website operator’s “decisions with respect to that posting, but
also for its inherent decisions about how to treat postings
generally.”50 A website operator’s decisions in structuring its
website, choosing what words and phrases can appear on the
website, and deciding whether to “publish, withdraw, postpone,
or alter content” are editorial choices that are considered

44. See LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d at 175; FTC v. Accusearch Inc.,
570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009).
45. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d at 1197 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)).
46. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f)(2)–(3); Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
at 1162 (9th Cir. 2008); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206
F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2000).
47. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2008); 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(1), (f)(2)–(3).
48. See MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 419.
49. Gillette, supra note 24 (“Section 230 cases frequently result in the
spectacle of a tech giant squashing the complaints of users and smaller
websites.”).
50. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007)).
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“traditional publisher functions.”51 The website operator is
generally only liable under § 230 if the party conducts “its own
speech” on the website.52
There was hope that courts would take a more critical
stance towards § 230 when a more egregious group of bad actors,
like “sites facilitating sex trafficking,” were involved.53 The case
of Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC put a damper on these hopes.54
In Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, the plaintiffs alleged that
Backpage.com (“Backpage”) acted with the intention to facilitate
sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise victims of sex trafficking on
their website, and that Backpage’s rules and processes
governing advertisements made sex trafficking easier to
conduct.55 The plaintiffs were victims of sex trafficking which
resulted from advertisements posted on Backpage.56 The
advertisements posted on Backpage included images of the
particular plaintiffs, usually taken by the traffickers.57 As a
result of the advertisements, the plaintiffs were raped numerous
times; two of the plaintiffs were allegedly raped 1,000 and 900
times respectively by users of the website.58 The plaintiffs
alleged that Backpage, “engaged in a course of conduct designed
to facilitate sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise their victims on
the website . . . [which] led to their victimization.”59
Backpage provided online advertising, and allowed users of
its site to post advertisements of categories that relate to the
user’s product or service that is being sold.60 It hosted more than

51. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 20–21 (citing Zeran v. Am. Online,
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)); see Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206
F.3d at 986 (“Congress clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of
publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and selfregulatory functions.”).
52. Hiam v. HomeAway.com, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 338, 346 (D. Mass.
2017) (quoting Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d at 419–20).
53. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just
Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 455
(2018).
54. Id. at 453.
55. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 16.
56. Id. at 17.
57. Id. (noting that a small number of the photos were taken by the
plaintiffs).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 16.
60. Id.
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eighty percent of the online advertising for “illegal commercial
sex in the United States.”61 One of the categories on Backpage’s
website was titled “Adult Entertainment,” which contained a
subsection titled “Escorts.”62 Backpage had an automated
filtering system that screened out advertisements containing
certain prohibited terms, such as “barely legal” and “high
school,” but the person posting the advertisement could
implement similar phrases, such as “brly legal” or “high schl”
which would circumvent the filtering system.63
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that
Backpage was exercising traditional publisher functions.
Backpage did not require phone or email verification for an
account, nor the specific date, time, or location of the
photographs in the advertisements, and Backpage’s rules
allowed people to post in the future after they had entered a
The plaintiffs
prohibited term in a previous post.64
acknowledged that the content of the advertisements were
provided by either the traffickers, or the plaintiffs themselves,
Due to Backpage exercising traditional
not Backpage.65
publisher functions, and not acting as the speaker of the content,
§ 230(c)(1) barred the plaintiffs’ claim.66
Courts have also rejected claims seeking to hold website
operators liable for “failing to provide sufficient protections to
users from harmful content created by others.”67 In Doe v.
MySpace Incorporated, the plaintiffs sued MySpace Inc.
(“MySpace”) alleging that MySpace failed to “implement basic
safety measures to prevent sexual predators from
communicating with minors on its web site.”68 The plaintiff’s
daughter was thirteen years old when she created a MySpace
account.69 The daughter lied on her Myspace profile and said
that she was eighteen years old, which allowed her to evade the

61. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12,
(No. 16-276).
62. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 16.
63. Id. at 17.
64. Id. at 21.
65. Id. at 19.
66. Id. at 23–24.
67. Id. at 21.
68. Doe v. MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008).
69. Id.
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safety features on the website and made her profile public.70 The
daughter met a nineteen-year-old man on MySpace, and when
the two met in person, the daughter was sexually assaulted by
him.71
The plaintiffs alleged that MySpace was not the publisher
of the information, so § 230 would not protect MySpace from the
plaintiffs’ claims.72 They alleged that their claim was predicated
solely on “MySpace’s failure to implement basic safety measures
to protect minors.”73 The district court and Fifth Circuit rejected
the plaintiffs’ argument, holding that if MySpace had not
published communications and contact information of the
daughter and the nineteen-year-old, the two would have never
met.74 MySpace was afforded § 230 protection because it
exercised traditional public functions, and the plaintiffs’ claim
was dismissed.75
The Second Circuit applied a similar analysis when a
plaintiff alleged that Grindr LLC, an online dating application,
was “defectively designed and manufactured.”76 Plaintiff’s exboyfriend “created Grindr profiles to impersonate [plaintiff],”
and the ex-boyfriend directed other users on the application to
plaintiff’s home and workplace.77 The court concluded that the
plaintiff’s “ex-boyfriend’s online speech is precisely the basis of
[plaintiff’s] claims that Grindr is defective and dangerous,” and
that this claim is based on “information provided by another
information content provider.”78 Grindr was afforded § 230
immunity, and the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.79
Currently, as long as the material was created by a thirdparty and the website operator did not “materially contribute to
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 419.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 419–20 (citing Doe v. MySpace Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849
(W.D. Tex. 2007)). In a similar 2002 case, the plaintiff argued that the
defendant internet service provider failed to protect the user on its site, and
the case was dismissed because it related to the defendant’s “monitoring,
screening, and deletion of content from its network,” which are traditional
publisher functions. Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2002).
75. MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d at 422.
76. Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 588 (2d Cir. 2019).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 590.
79. Id. at 591.
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its development,” a website operator is granted “broad
immunity” from § 230(c)(1).80 As the courts have afforded
website operators § 230(c)(1) protection in situations of sex
trafficking, death threats, sexual abuse, and other gruesome
acts, debate emerges over whether § 230 needs to be remedied,
and if so, is Congress, the courts, or the public consumers the
best group to bring about that change.
IV. SECTION 230(C)(2)’S GOAL TO ENCOURAGE CONTENT
MONITORING, AND WHY IT FAILED
While there are frequent claims from individuals being
harmed by the content displayed on a website, there are also
claims from individuals when the website operator modifies or
removes third-party’s content. Many individuals allege a
deprivation of their free speech rights when a website operator
modifies or removes their content from a site.81
One goal of § 230 was to “encourage voluntary monitoring
for offensive or obscene material” without fear of liability.82 The
statute does not require website operators to filter offensive
content,83 but states that website operators shall not be liable
for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected.”84 The purpose of §
230(c)(2) is to provide internet companies a “safety net” with
regards to filtering out content on their sites that the internet
company deems to be offensive.85
80. See Hugh T. McKeegan, When All You Have Is a Hammer, 80 U. PITT.
L. REV. 191, 195 (2018).
81. Ryan French, Comment, Picking Up the Pieces: Finding Unity After
the Communications Decency Act Section 230 Jurisprudential Clash, 72 LA. L.
REV. 443, 479 n.263 (2012).
82. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2009)
(citing Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003));
see also Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 239
(2018) (“Section 230(c)(2)(A) encourages websites to keep objectionable content
out without fear of liability for failing to do so well.”).
83. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rts. Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).
84. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
85. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Congress did not include every type of offensive speech in §
230(c)(2), so courts have inferred that Congress likely intended
to provide forms of discouraged content that “Congress could not
identify in the 1990s.”86 Congress intended to give website
operators “tools to avoid not only violent or sexually explicit
materials, but also harassing materials.”87 Courts have taken
this to signify that “[s]pam, malware and adware could fairly be
placed close enough to harassing materials to at least be called
‘otherwise objectionable.’”88
A website operator has “unbridled discretion” under §
230(c)(2) to block the online material based on the content of the
post, and not because of the “identity of the entity that produced
it.”89 Website operators have “robust statutory immunity” under
§ 230(c)(2), allowing courts to adjudicate these cases in a more
time and cost efficient manner and advance the courts’ interest
in judicial economy.90 As long as the website operator exercised
“good-faith efforts,” the website operator may screen and/or
block third-party content.91
Although § 230(c)(2) does provide “unbridled discretion,”
website operators generally prefer to rely on § 230(c)(1) to defend
their actions because § 230(c)(2) requires the website operator’s
blocking and screening be made in “good faith.”92 “Plaintiffs
always have incentives to contest the defendant’s good faith,
which delays the court’s application of [§] 230(c)(2)’s immunity—
and sometimes overcomes it.”93
86. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 938 F.3d
1026, 1037 (9th Cir. 2019).
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097,
1104–05 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining that the challenger has to claim that the
website operator acted in bad faith by removing the post); e360Insight, LLC v.
Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (concluding that
extreme deference to the website operator’s subjective determination is
permissible).
89. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 938 F.3d at 1033.
90. Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(2), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 659, 671 (2012).
91. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016).
92. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 938 F.3d at 1036; see Eric Goldman,
The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
1, 6 (2017).
93. Goldman, supra note 92, at 6; see Goldman, supra note 90, at 671
(arguing that the “good faith” aspect of § 230(c)(2) should be removed because
it increases the chances that both parties will accumulate high adjudication
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These concerns have been contrasted with strong policy
arguments for the value of § 230(c)(2). Eric Goldman, a
Professor at the Santa Clara University School of Law, predicted
two reasons why website operators will use § 230(c)(2)
infrequently.94 Goldman argued that (1) website operators are
reluctant to terminate customers from their sites because
customers increase revenue for website operators; and (2) that
website operators will be concerned with losing customer trust
if they capriciously terminate accounts or remove posts.95
Website operators want leeway to shape their website in a way
that will engage customers and promote the free expression of
consumers, which is important for growth.96
Websites need some “provider intervention” to protect
website users from other users and to prevent security or
technical concerns.97 An additional challenge to modifying or
removing third-party content is that flagging the content on a
website requires an ample amount of resources. The fear of
being sued may cause online entrepreneurs to be hesitant in
developing new applications, as they would have to “divert
resources to defend the parade of lawsuits arising from illegal
third-party conduct.”98
Facebook has invested a lot of money into moderating
content posted on its website, and its large investment has been
insufficient in removing hate speech and misinformation from
the platform. Facebook has 15,000 content moderators around
the world who are responsible for reviewing “potentially
objectionable content” and then making a decision as to whether

costs just to reach a prevailing decision for the website operator).
94. Goldman, supra note 90, at 672.
95. Id. Goldman’s article referred specifically to terminating user
accounts under § 230(c)(2), but Goldman’s application can be evaluated when
looking at all actions website operators can take under § 230(c)(2).
96. See Gillette, supra note 24; Daphne Keller, The Stubborn, Misguided
Myth that Internet Platforms Must Be ‘Neutral,’ WASH. POST (July 29, 2019,
6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/29/stubbornnonsensical-myth-that-internet-platforms-must-be-neutral/ (“If platforms
couldn’t enforce content policies while retaining immunity, communications
today would look a lot like they did in 1965. We could passively consume the
carefully vetted content created by big companies like NBC, . . . but we wouldn’t
have many options in between.”).
97. Goldman, supra note 90, at 670–71.
98. Sylvain, supra note 82, at 244.
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the content can remain on Facebook.99 Content moderators have
been described as the closest parallel to first responders, as they
are often the “first line of defense for reporting and responding
to various crimes playing out online.”100 There are more than
100,000 content moderators in the world, with some estimates
as high as 150,000.101
In just her first day as a content moderator, one of the
moderators learned the emotional challenges that come with the
job, as she saw, among other things, “anti-Semitic speech,
bestiality photos and video of what seemed to be a girl and boy
told by an adult off-screen to have sexual contact with each
other.”102 Content moderators can be fired after making only “a
handful of errors a week” in deciding to remove the content or
allow the content to remain on the website.103 They are also
developing “PTSD-like symptoms.”104 Commenters note that,
“[m]oderators cope with seeing traumatic images and videos by
telling dark jokes about committing suicide, then smoking weed
during breaks to numb their emotions.”105 “Accenture, which
99. Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-contentmoderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona; Lauren Weber &
Deepa Seetharaman, The Worst Job in Technology: Staring at Human
Depravity to Keep It off Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2017, 10:42 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-worst-job-in-technology-staring-at-humandepravity-to-keep-it-off-facebook-1514398398.
100. Benjamin Powers, The Human Cost of Monitoring the Internet,
STONE
(Sept.
9,
2017,
1:00
PM),
ROLLING
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/the-human-cost-ofmonitoring-the-internet-202291/ (estimating that there are 150,000 content
moderators as of 2017); see Casey Newton, What Tech Companies Should Do
About Their Content Moderators’ PTSD, VERGE (Jan. 28, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/1/28/21082642/content-moderatorptsd-facebook-youtube-accenture-solutions (“[C]ontent moderation is often a
dead-end career.”).
101. Isaac Chotiner, The Underworld of Online Content Moderation, NEW
YORKER (July 5, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/theunderworld-of-online-content-moderation; Powers, supra note 100.
102. Weber & Seetharaman, supra note 99.
103. Newton, supra note 100.
104. Id.
105. Id.; see Elizabeth Dwoskin, et al., Content Moderators at YouTube,
Facebook and Twitter See the Worst of the Web—and Suffer Silently, WASH.
POST
(July
25,
2019,
1:00
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/25/social-mediacompanies-are-outsourcing-their-dirty-work-philippines-generation-workersis-paying-price/ (stating that moderators are expected to maintain accuracy
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sells its content moderation services to Facebook, YouTube, and
Twitter, among others, requires employees to acknowledge that
their work can lead to PTSD.”106 Employing content moderators
is a burdensome task for website operators that host large
amounts of third-party content like Facebook and YouTube. If
fewer users are engaging in their services because companies are
restricting harmful speech, the value of their applications is
reduced.107
Not only is there a high turnover rate with content
moderators, content moderators require a lot of investment and
resources.108 Facebook has 15,000 content moderators who get
paid at an average salary of $28,800, totaling $432 million in
labor costs for content moderators.109 That does not include the
cost of equipment, the cost of developing strategies for content
moderation, or the indirect costs of employing content
moderators, such as having therapists to help them better cope
with the content they are viewing.110 Although Facebook invests
a lot of capital to monitor its platform, there is still a lot more
Facebook needs to do to combat misinformation and hate speech,
given the amount of people that use Facebook and rely on it to
obtain news.111
levels over ninety-five percent).
106. Newton, supra note 100.
107. Sylvain, supra note 82, at 244.
108. Id.; see also The Daily, A Criminal Underworld of Child Abuse, Part
1, N.Y. TIMES, at 16:08 (Feb. 19, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify) (noting that
there is a high turnover rate for law enforcement officers involved in mitigating
child sexual abuse imagery).
109. Newton, supra note 100; see Rob Copeland & Tripp Mickle, Silicon
Valley Was First to Send Workers Home. It’s Been Messy., WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14,
2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-was-first-to-sendworkers-home-its-been-messy-11584190800?mod=business_lead_pos10
(stating that during the COVID-19 outbreak, Facebook recommended its
employees remain at home when feasible). But Facebook required content
moderators reviewing posts of urgent danger, “such as the policing of videos or
images related to child abuse or pornography,” to remain at the office. Id.
110. Weber & Seetharaman, supra note 99.
111. See Deepa Seetharaman, QAnon Booms on Facebook as Conspiracy
Group Gains Mainstream Traction, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2020, 9:10 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/qanon-booms-on-facebook-as-conspiracy-groupgains-mainstream-traction-11597367457 (noting that “Facebook groups have
been central to building the QAnon network,” which is known for embracing
many debunked conspiracy theories); Lukas I. Alpert, Coronavirus
Misinformation Spreads on Facebook, Watchdog Says, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20,
2020, 10:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-misinformation-
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Content moderators have proven to help make websites
safer, but content moderators will need a healthier work
environment to prevent high employee turnover and emotional
issues that result from the job.112 Content moderators need to
be informed, before accepting the position, of the emotional
challenges that come with the job.113 Companies also need to
ensure strong mental health programs for content moderators
and incorporate rotation programs for the content moderators to
limit exposure to traumatic content in intermittent periods.114
These investments will require substantial capital, but to
sustain content moderation, website operators must promote a
healthy work environment for content moderators.
In September 2018, Twitter attempted to enact a policy
similar to Facebook’s.115 Twitter will use artificial intelligence
to combat speech that violates its policies, and users can report
offensive tweets, but “the suspect tweets will always be reviewed
by a human.”116 Twitter has only 1,500 content moderators,
compared to around 15,000 content moderators at Facebook.117
Twitter leaves dangerous content on its site instead of removing
it by filtering to make the content not “immediately visible to a

spreads-on-facebook-watchdog-says-11587436159 (finding that even though
Facebook is making efforts to limit misinformation on COVID-19, there are
many posts on Facebook “promoting bogus Covid-19 cures and conspiracy
theories about the origins of the coronavirus”); Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook
Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmar-facebook.html
(explaining that Facebook allowed misinformation and hate speech that
“fuel[ed] modern ethnic cleansing in Myanmar,” and Myanmar military
officials used misinformation on Facebook to cause the “murder, rape and
forced migration” of Rohingya Muslims).
112. Aidan O’Shea, Getting the Business of Content Moderation Right,
https://www.voxprogroup.com/millennials-and-workplaceVOXPRO,
culture/getting-the-business-of-content-moderation-right/ (last visited Sept.
26, 2020).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Sara Harrison, Twitter and Instagram Unveil New Ways to Combat
(July
11,
2019,
7:00
AM),
Hate—Again,
WIRED
https://www.wired.com/story/twitter-instagram-unveil-new-ways-combathate-again/.
116. Id.
117. Jason Koebler & Joseph Cox, How Twitter Sees Itself, VICE (Oct. 7,
2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a35nbj/twitter-contentmoderation.
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user.”118 Twitter has asserted that it wants to create a safer
website, but the measures Twitter has put in place have not
achieved its objectives. Twitter has ignored the advice of
scholars who have asked to help mitigate offensive speech on
their platform.119 During the period of January 2019 through
June 2019, 11.757 million accounts were reported for harmful
content on Twitter.120
The amount of content on these websites illustrates why
these companies need § 230 immunity:
According to the social media intelligence firm
Brandwatch, there are about 3.2 billion images
shared each day. On Youtube there are 300 hours
of video uploaded every minute. On Twitter, 500
million tweets are sent each day, which amounts
to about 6,000 Tweets each second. If two percent
of the images uploaded daily are inappropriate,
that means that on any given day, there may [be]
64 million posts that violate a terms of service
agreement alone.121
This high volume of content shows the pressure facing
website operators and the breadth of liability that website
operators would be subject to without § 230 immunity. Facebook
and other large website operators have the resources to invest
in content moderators, but most other smaller website operators
are struggling to achieve profitability and do not have the
resources to invest in modifying and removing offensive speech
on their websites.122
118. Id.
119. See Deepa Seetharaman, Jack Dorsey’s Push to Clean Up Twitter
Stalls, Researchers Say, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2020, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-dorseys-push-to-clean-up-twitter-stallsresearchers-say-11584264600?mod=business_lead_pos1.
120. Id. (finding that during the January–June 2019 period, 4.551 million
accounts were reported for harmful conduct about abuse, 5.202 million
accounts were reported for posting hateful conduct, and 2.004 million accounts
were reported for posting violent threats on Twitter).
121. Powers, supra note 100.
122. See Xin En Lee, No profit? No problem. Investors Keep Snapping up
Loss-Making
Companies,
CNBC
(Sept.
2,
2018,
2:40
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/29/no-profits-no-problem-the-economy-has-agrowing-appetite-for-unprofitable-companies.html (noting that as of 2018, only
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V. THE CRITICISM OFFERED TOWARDS § 230
There are benefits that § 230 has advanced, which Congress
has pointed out, but there are flaws with § 230 that need to be
considered.
The district court in Blumenthal v. Drudge
expressed concern about § 230 when it said:
If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court
would agree with plaintiffs. [A website operator]
has certain editorial rights with respect to the
content provided by [the third party] and
disseminated by [the website operator], including
the right to require changes in content and to
remove it; . . . [b]ecause [a website operator] has
the right to exercise editorial control over those
with whom it contracts and whose words it
disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold [the
website operator] to the liability standards
applied to a publisher or, at least, like a book store
owner or a library, to the liability standards
applied to a distributor.123
The concern with content monitoring is that the guidelines
for how to monitor the content of its users should be set by the
legislature.124 The court in Blumenthal emphasized this concern
when stating that companies should be responsible for
monitoring users’ content, but they must oblige the legislative
intent in § 230.125 Right now, the responsibility is up to website
operators to initiate their own policies. But if “all of the ‘big five’
seventeen percent of tech companies were profitable); Mike Masnick, Before
Demanding Internet Companies ‘Hire More Moderators,’ Perhaps We Should
Look at How Awful the Job Is, TECHDIRT (June 21, 2019, 10:44 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190619/17491542435/before-demandinginternet-companies-hire-more-moderators-perhaps-we-should-look-howawful-job-is.shtml (stating that the only way to achieve content monitoring is
to “hire a ton of people and subject them to absolutely horrific content over and
over . . . again”).
123. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1998).
124. Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO.
L.J. 1353, 1385 (2018).
125. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52.
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tech [companies]-Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, and
Alphabet . . . adopted a joint policy to suppress hate speech
wherever they can,” we would be leaving “such a complex and
momentous social decision to the boards of . . . private
corporations clustered in the San Francisco and Seattle
metropolitan areas.”126
The legislature has provided increased criticism towards §
230, with both political parties having negative sentiment
towards the statute.127 Republican members of Congress have
asserted that website operators have “suppress[ed] their
viewpoints, arguing that the spirit of Section 230 is predicated
on companies remaining politically neutral.”128 Democrats, on
the other hand, express concern that tech companies often rely
on § 230 “to ignore the collateral damage of their users’ bad
behavior.”129 Even the former United States Attorney General,
William Barr, has criticized § 230, although he said that the
United States Department of Justice has not declared a position
on the law.130 Attorney General Barr said, “[t]he early days of
online public bulletin boards . . . have been replaced by platforms
with sophisticated content moderation tools, algorithms,
recommendation features, and targeting. With these new tools,
the line between passively hosting third-party speech and
actively curating or promoting speech starts to blur.”131
President Trump has been critical of social media companies
flagging or removing speech by third-party users on their
platforms when that speech violates the company’s policies.132

126. Langvardt, supra note 124, at 1385.
127. See Gillette, supra note 24.
128. Id.; see also Anna Wiener, Trump, Twitter, Facebook, and the Future
YORKER
(July
6,
2020),
of
Online
Speech,
NEW
https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-silicon-valley/trump-twitterfacebook-and-the-future-of-online-speech (noting that the theory of
conservative viewpoints being censored on social media is a “theory among
conservatives . . . with no supporting data”).
129. Gillette, supra note 24.
130. See William P. Barr, Attorney General Dep’t of Justice, Opening
Remarks at the DOJ Workshop on Section 230: Nurturing Innovation or
Fostering Unaccountability? (Feb. 19, 2020).
131. Id.
132. Maggie Haberman & Kate Conger, Trump Signs Executive Order on
Social Media, Claiming to Protect ‘Free Speech,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/28/us/politics/trump-order-socialmedia.html.
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On May 28, 2020, President Trump issued an “Executive Order
on Preventing Online Censorship,” arguing that social media
companies have not acted in “good faith” in removing third-party
content, and a company that removes third-party content in bad
faith should lose its protection under § 230(c)(2).133 The
Executive Order asks, among other things, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) to declare what actions
constitute restricting speech “in good faith,” in an attempt to
limit the authority of website operators to moderate their own
platforms.134
Legal experts assert that the Executive Order is “toothless
in terms of enforcement.”135 In general, the First Amendment
“prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech.”136 The
First Amendment does not apply to private entities when the
private entity is providing a forum for speech, “because the
private entity is not a state actor.”137 The FCC emphasized that
President Trump’s Executive Order has no impact on website
operators, stating that “the First Amendment and Section 230
remain the law of the land and control here.”138 While we have
yet to see substantive changes to § 230, Democrats and
Republicans have both addressed discontent with the law,139
marking a warning to website operators that change may be on
the horizon.
Some critics have suggested that “notice-based liability”
would be a proper responsibility for website operators to
133. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020).
134. Id.
135. Jon Swartz, Trump Executive Order to Punish Social-Media
Platforms is Largely Toothless, Legal Experts Say, MARKETWATCH (May 29,
2020, 12:35 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-executive-orderto-punish-social-media-platforms-is-largely-toothless-legal-experts-say-202005-28; see Shirin Ghaffary, Trump’s Executive Order on Social Media Is Legally
Unenforceable, Experts Say, VOX (May 28, 2020, 8:05 PM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/28/21273878/trump-executive-ordertwitter-social-media-section-230-free-speech-implications.
136. Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 19-7030, 2020 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16948, at *4 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2020) (quoting Manhattan Cmty. Access
Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019)).
137. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930 (“The private entity may thus exercise
editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in the forum.”).
138. FCC, Statement by Commissioner Starks On Section 230 Executive
Order
(May
28,
2020),
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC364610A1.pdf.
139. See Gillette, supra note 24.
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uphold.140 “Notice-based liability” would impose liability on
website operators for “third-party defamatory content only on
proof of notice and subsequent failure to remove the defamatory
content within a reasonable time.”141 The Fourth Circuit,
dissatisfied with a notice-based liability argument, said that
notice of a “potentially defamatory posting” thrusts the website
operator “into the role of a traditional publisher.”142 The
“traditional editorial functions” are exactly what § 230 is
intended to protect.143 An additional issue with “notice-based
liability” is that it does not prevent the harm from the thirdparty content of being enacted. Content moderators must
determine whether the third-party content should be removed
before more users see the content, but this is after the content
has already been on the website for users to see.144
With “notice-based liability,” the damage would already be
done by the time content moderators review the content, and the
website operator would feel forced to remove the content out of
concern for defamation liability.145 It would be impossible for
“notice-based liability” to be applied equally because website
operators have different amounts of resources to allocate to
content monitoring. The companies that do not have the
resources to invest in content monitoring would receive notice of
the third-party content too late, making them unable to mitigate
the damage. The companies that do have the resources to invest
in content monitoring would be subject to defamation and free
speech liability every time a content moderator makes a decision
140. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel:
Revisiting § 230 Immunity, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1532–33 (2015).
141. Id. at 1507.
142. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
143. Id. at 330 (“[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its
exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”).
144. See Queenie Wong, Facebook Content Moderation Is an Ugly
Business. Here’s Who Does It, CNET (June 19, 2019, 12:53 PM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-content-moderation-is-an-ugly-businessheres-who-does-it/ (explaining that the content has already been on the website
before content moderators must decide to allow or remove the post).
145. See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in
Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 569, 640–41 (2001) (noting that “notice-based liability” would lead to
a reduced level of online speech, and First Amendment concerns as website
operators would “find it easier just to remove the posting rather than
investigate”).
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to permit or remove a post, which raises the concern of endless
litigation that the legislature and courts feared.146
The criticism towards § 230 emerges from our innovative
technology sector. The United States is very innovative; our
technology and economy grow at a much faster rate than our
legal system can keep up with.147 Innovation in the technology
sector illustrates not only that website operators need § 230, but
public citizens need it as well because the customs of public
citizens adapt to advances in technology. Individuals “love what
Section 230 does for them,”148 and politicians think of § 230 as a
Facebook and Twitter problem instead of looking at the internet
in totality. Website operators that rely on generating content
from third-party users (i.e., Yelp, Reddit, etc.) would be crushed
without the protection of § 230,149 disrupting the innovation
developed through many website operators on the internet.
A 2019 Pew Research Report showed that fifty-five percent
of Americans get their news from social media “either ‘often’ or
‘sometimes,’” an eight percent increase from 2018.150 As social
media becomes more important in relaying news to the public,
the public expects more content moderation in regulating
disinformation on websites.151 Most news sources do not receive
§ 230 immunity.152 If social media has been injected into the role
146. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“Interactive computer services have
millions of users . . . [and] [t]he specter of tort liability . . . would have an
obvious chilling effect. It would be impossible for service providers to screen
each of their millions of postings for possible problems.”).
147. Julia Griffith, A Losing Game: The Law Is Struggling to Keep Up
HIGH
TECH.
L.
(Apr.
12,
2019),
with
Technology,
J.
https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhtl/2019/04/12/a-losing-game-the-law-is-strugglingto-keep-up-with-technology/ (“Technology seems to be advancing at a rate that
the law simply cannot keep up with. It has been estimated that the law is at
least five years behind developing a technology.”).
148. Wiener, supra note 128.
149. Id.
150. Peter Suciu, More Americans Are Getting Their News from Social
(Oct.
11,
2019,
10:35
AM),
Media,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2019/10/11/more-americans-aregetting-their-news-from-social-media/#6b7b60673e17; see also 47 U.S.C. §
230(a)(5) (“Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”).
151. Carys Afoko, Government Can’t Regulate Facebook – It’s Up to All of
(Apr.
1,
2019,
2:00
PM),
Us,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/01/governmentregulate-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-social-media.
152. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting
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of conveying the news, the public wants them to take a more
proactive approach in flagging misinformation and ensuring
that the news conveyed is informative. But social media was
founded on connecting people all around the world. The
evolution of social media into a news outlet for most Americans
is a new responsibility. Social media companies are again
fearing the consequence of restricting free speech and the limits
of their § 230 immunity.153
VI. THE SOLUTION: MAINTAIN § 230, BUT RESOLVE THIS
INTERNET PROBLEM THROUGH TAX CREDITS
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit emphasized the
financial and legal problems that will arise to website operators
by making them responsible for content that third parties post
on their websites.154 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
recognized the burden placed on website operators by imposing
the need to monitor content by stating, “[i]t would be impossible
for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings
for possible problems.”155 These challenges are compounded by
the fact that only seventeen percent of tech companies are
profitable, and most of them do not have the cash on hand to
devote to monitoring content and to finance substantial
increases in legal costs.156 If Congress ends or limits § 230
protection for website operators, it could significantly reduce the
topics discussed on the internet, as well as the number of users
speaking on websites.157 Legal experts have echoed the negative
financial impact that revoking § 230 would have on website
operators in asserting:
that if the court had the chance to do it all over again, it would have given
website operators a similar level of liability as news distributors).
153. See generally The Impact of Social Media: Is it Irreplaceable?,
(July
26,
2019),
WHARTON
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/impact-of-social-media/
(“[S]ocial media . . . continues to evolve at lightning speed, making it tricky to
predict which way it will morph next.”).
154. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2016); see
also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
155. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (explaining that website operators would feel
pressured to “severely restrict the number and type” of content posted on sites
if not afforded § 230 immunity).
156. Lee, supra note 122.
157. Goldman, supra note 90, at 671.
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Without Section 230, only platforms with the
resources for constant litigation would survive;
even there, user-generated content would be
heavily restricted in service of diminished
liability. Social-media startups might fade away,
along with niche political sites, birding message
boards, classifieds, restaurant reviews, supportgroup forums, and comments sections. In their
place would be a desiccated, sanitized, corporate
Internet—less like an electronic frontier than a
well-patrolled office park.158
Limiting or removing § 230 is not the solution; Congress
needs to incentivize website operators to invest in monitoring
third-party content on its websites through a tax credit.159
Website operators are generally not the creators of the harmful
messages on their websites, but intermediaries in publishing the
posts.160 In serving as intermediaries, website operators should
be encouraged to take part in the solution, not be scared with
the threat of liability.
Large companies that are investing in initiatives to reduce
harmful content on their websites are seeing positive results.161
The European Union reported that Facebook, Google,
Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube removed an average of
seventy-two percent of hate speech on their platforms during
2018, and eighty-nine percent of “content flagged as hate speech
was reviewed by [these companies] within 24 hours, up from 40
percent in 2016.”162 Some companies are also using artificial
158. Wiener, supra note 128.
159. Patrick J. Lipaj, Opportunity in Ohio: Rethinking Northeast Ohio’s
Opportunity Zones with Local Legislation, 68 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 835, 852 (2020)
(citation omitted) (“Tax credits offset the amount of tax due, meaning that a $1
tax credit saves $1 in tax for taxpayers in every tax bracket on their gross
income.”).
160. See Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016)
(citing Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 387 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006)).
161. Elizabeth Schulze, EU Says Facebook, Google, and Twitter Are
Getting Faster at Removing Hate Speech Online, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019, 12:07
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/facebook-google-and-twitter-aregetting-faster-at-removing-hate-speech-online-eu-finds--.html.
162. Id. In 2016, these companies only removed twenty-eight percent of
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intelligence and algorithms to detect hateful speech on their
websites.163 While these initiatives are not going to completely
eliminate dangerous content on these websites, they help reduce
offensive speech online.164 We must encourage all companies to
take these actions, and the best way to get companies that do
not have the capital to invest in content monitoring to take part
is for Congress to provide tax incentives.
Investing in content monitoring requires an immense
amount of capital. Facebook has 15,000 content moderators, and
Google has 10,000 employees working to mitigate hate speech on
its platform.165 When these companies include the costs of
building and maintaining the artificial intelligence to monitor
hateful content, the costs become significant.166 This is an
unreasonable task to ask every website operator to invest in

hate speech on its platform. Id. Facebook and Instagram have removed 82.4%
and 70.6% of hate speech respectively; Google and YouTube have removed
80.0% and 85.4% respectively; Twitter has removed 43.5%. Id.; see also Billy
Perrigo, Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech than Ever Before. But
(Nov.
27,
2019,
4:42
AM),
There’s
a
Catch.,
TIME
https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages/
(“Facebook
removed more than seven million instances of hate speech in the third quarter
of 2019, . . . an increase of 59% [from] the previous quarter.”).
163. Perrigo, supra note 162 (“Facebook [can] now automatically detect
80% of hateful posts without needing a user to have reported them first.”); see
also Seetharaman, supra note 119 (explaining that Twitter has discussed
initiatives to use artificial intelligence to detect hateful speech, but these
efforts have not come to fruition).
164. Perrigo, supra note 162 (explaining that Facebook’s algorithm covers
around forty languages, leaving hateful speech in the many other languages
undiscovered by the algorithm); see also Shirin Ghaffary, The Algorithms that
Detect Hate Speech Online Are Biased Against Black People, VOX (Aug. 15,
2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/8/15/20806384/socialmedia-hate-speech-bias-black-african-american-facebook-twitter (discussing a
study finding that artificial intelligence models for processing hate speech were
one-and-a-half times more like to detect and flag tweets as hateful when
written by African Americans). “[The models were] 2.2 times more likely to
flag tweets written in African American English (which is commonly spoken
by black people in the US).” Id.
165. Newton, supra note 100; Schulze, supra note 161; Perrigo, supra note
162 (adding that Facebook has content moderators working “24 hours a day,
seven days a week”).
166. These large companies have not disclosed the costs of their
algorithms intended to remove hate speech. See Kirsten Grind et al., How
Google Interferes with Its Search Algorithms and Changes Your Results, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-googleinterferes-with-its-search-algorithms-and-changes-your-results-11573823753
(noting that Google rarely releases information on its algorithms).
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without Congress providing some assistance.
Critics may argue that we should not be using the Internal
Revenue Code (“IRC”) as a solution to make platforms safer.167
They argue that the IRC “should not be used for social policy
purposes,” but rather social policies should be funded directly
and openly by the government.168 But the tax code has been used
many times by the federal and state governments to directly
impact specific industries,169 and a tax credit has the same
financial impact as direct funding from the government while
also being easier legislation to enact.
In 1992, Congress enacted The Renewable Electricity
Production Tax Credit (“PTC”), which today allows energy
companies a tax credit “for electricity generated using qualified
energy resources.”170 The PTC amounts to the product of “1.5
cents, multiplied by . . . the kilowatt hours of electricity . . .
produced by the taxpayer . . . from qualified energy resources . .
. that are sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the
taxable year.”171 The primary reason for originally enacting
these tax subsidies was to encourage the United States to
become more energy independent and competitive with fossil
fuels as the United States was importing a lot of its oil supply.172
Congress also believed that the PTC was important to benefit
the public as the PTC would contribute to reduce greenhouse
emissions and pollution, which would benefit “society as a

167. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
319, 382 (2005) (explaining that, among other concerns, an objection that
critics raise to using “tax expenditures” being implemented to advance
economic issues is that the “tax expenditures will place too high of an
administrative burden on the IRS”).
168. Id. (citing Bernard Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of
Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (1965)) (making the argument that direct
subsidies to individuals and entities are a better solution than through tax
expenditures).
169. Kesan & Shah, supra note 167, at 383.
170. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 1 (2018). “Qualified energy resources”
means, among other things, wind, solar energy, geothermal energy, and
hydropower production. I.R.C. § 45(c)(1).
171. I.R.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2).
172. Merrill Matthews, It’s Time to Hit the Off Switch for Solar, Wind
HILL
(Dec.
17,
2019,
5:00
PM),
Power
Tax
Breaks,
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/474891-its-time-to-hit-the-offswitch-for-solar-wind-power-tax-breaks.
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whole.”173 While a tax break for website operators hosting thirdparty content would have the objective of improving the
industry, it would also provide a benefit to the public by creating
a safer environment on the internet.
When policies benefit the public as a whole, those policies
will look to be incorporated globally. More than fifty percent of
the world’s “renewable energy subsidies” are provided by
countries in the European Union (“EU”), and other countries
such as Canada, Japan, Australia, Israel, China, and India have
invested in renewable energy subsidies.174 Content moderation
has also seen a global response, illustrating the global mission
to mitigate online harmful content. In 2016, the EU enacted a
“Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online” with
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube, which encouraged
these companies to flag illegal hate speech and dispose of it in
an appropriate time frame.175 By the end of 2018, most of these
companies saw significant progress in flagging and removing
hateful content; Google, Instagram, Snapchat, and Dailymotion
decided to join the Code of Conduct in 2018.176 The EU’s action
helps show that content moderation is a global issue and that
advancements in content moderation will benefit the public. The
companies that joined the Code of Conduct (besides
Dailymotion) are worth billions of dollars, illustrating that it is
more difficult for smaller companies to invest in content
moderation.
We have also seen vital tax credits aimed at increasing
research and development (“R&D”) expenses across all
industries.177 The Research Tax Credit seeks to “encourage[]
173. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 10 (2018).
174. Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and
Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV.
401, 419–20 (2014).
175. Věra Jourová, Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech
Online: First Results on Implementation, EUR. COMM’N (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/201650/factsheet-code-conduct-8_40573.pdf.
176. Ana Garcia Valdivia, EU and IT Companies Make Significant
Progress Against Illegal Hate Speech Online, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2019, 8:50 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anagarciavaldivia/2019/02/05/eu-and-itcompanies-make-significant-progress-against-illegal-hate-speechonline/#1a9d2a97379a.
177. GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX
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business[es] to invest more in R&D than they otherwise
would”178 and reduces the tax burden on industries that require
high amounts of R&D costs to get their product to market.179
The IRC provides an R&D tax credit for any “qualified research
expenses,” allowing companies to receive a tax credit for around
twenty percent of R&D expenses.180
R&D tax credits have been crucial to industries that require
a lot of capital investment, like the pharmaceutical industry.181
Estimates suggest that the cost of a pharmaceutical
manufacturer to develop a new drug is “between $150 to $240
million,” with an additional $300 million more needed for “post
approval research.”182 The high amount of capital investment
for pharmaceutical companies comes with the risk that “[a]bout
85% of drug research projects fail before they are tested in
human clinical trials.”183 Investing in content moderation will
not require the same amount of capital investment as industries
like the pharmaceutical industry, but the investment will be a
huge financial burden for website operators and will require
trial and error to develop strong algorithms and a healthy work
environment for content moderators. Tax credits “have long
been used to support technological development,”184 and
Congress should welcome the opportunity to be a part of the
solution to a safer internet.
A tax incentive for website operators is not a permanent
solution. The objective would be for the legislature to help
website operators manage the initial costs of content
moderation, and once website operators have properly
CREDIT: CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS (2015).
178. Id.
179. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Pharmaceutical Policy in the United
States in 2019: An Overview of the Landscape and Avenues for Improvement,
30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 421, 428–29 (2019) (noting that it can cost a
pharmaceutical company approximately $2.6 billion to develop a new drug, and
the tax credit for R&D assists in managing the high amount of capital
investment).
180. I.R.C §§ 41(a), 174. Section 174 provides that R&D “paid or incurred
. . . during the taxable year in connection with [taxpayer’s] trade or business
as expenses,” rather than capital expenses are to be treated as a deduction
instead of a tax credit. Id.
181. Kesselheim et al., supra note 179, at 429–30.
182. Id. at 429.
183. Id. at 430.
184. Kesan & Shah, supra note 167, at 383.
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incorporated the costs of content moderation into their budgets,
then the companies would no longer need the tax credit. While
the PTC has been great for renewable energy globally, there is
growing concern that no one would invest in wind and solar
energy in the United States without the benefit of tax credits.185
A tax incentive is essential for website operators as they make
initial capital investment into content moderation,186 and once
they learn how to consistently incorporate these costs into their
income statements, the website operators would hopefully not
need the tax credit.
Website operators will need a tax credit to help mitigate the
additional costs because they will face a learning curve in
implementing content moderation strategies. Twitter explained
in its 2018 Annual Report that as more users and content enters
its site, it may become “increasingly difficult to maintain and
improve the performance of [Twitter’s] products and services, . .
. as [Twitter’s] products and services become more complex and
user traffic increases.”187 Twitter also acknowledged that it
wants to target hate speech and spam accounts through
launching algorithms, which will “require significant resources
and time.”188 While Facebook has invested a lot in content
moderation, not everything has gone smoothly.189 Patience is
required to allow these companies to find what content
moderation strategy is best for them. These companies are
helping the economy by investing “significant resources and
time,”190 and we need to encourage them to experiment and come
up with a solution they think is best. A tax credit will prevent
185. See Matthews, supra note 172; Michael Bastasch, Warren Buffett: I
Build Wind Turbines to Lower My Corporate Taxes, DAILY CALLER (May 6,
2014, 2:55 PM), https://dailycaller.com/2014/05/06/warren-buffett-i-buildwind-turbines-to-lower-my-corporate-taxes/ (explaining that Berkshire
Hathaway and other companies Warren Buffett owns invest in wind turbines
for the purpose of obtaining a tax credit).
186. See O’Shea, supra note 112 (suggesting that artificial intelligence is
an excellent tool to flag and remove harmful content, but content moderators
are also needed to flag and remove the content that is challenging for artificial
intelligence to detect).
187. Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23 (Feb. 20, 2019).
188. Id. at 25; see also Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24
(Aug. 1, 2019) (“Compliance with [online content] regulation[s] may involve
significant costs or require changes in products or business practices that
result in reduced revenue.”).
189. Ghaffary, supra note 164.
190. Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 20, 2019).
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these companies from rushing an unequipped solution, and it
will provide the financial assurance to develop content
moderation systems designed to have long-term success.
While a tax incentive for website operators to invest in
content moderation will entice investment in the short-term,
long-term success in content moderation is dependent on
companies accepting content moderation costs as regular
operating costs. The solution and action by website operators
will be more organic if they believe investing in content
moderation is the right thing to do, versus investing to receive a
tax credit.191 Some companies may not invest in content
moderation, but if the majority of website operators invest in
assets that mitigate dangerous content on their websites, then
laggards that are not investing in content moderation will be
encouraged to invest as a matter of public policy.
VII. WHY A TAX CREDIT IS A BETTER SOLUTION THAN A DIRECT
SUBSIDY OR TAX DEDUCTION
Congress can create business development through multiple
types of tax and funding initiatives.192 The legislature has,
among other things, provided direct subsidies to industries,
offered tax deductions to industries, and offered tax credits to
industries. Direct subsidies would fulfill a similar goal to the
tax credit by getting money directly to website operators, but it
would face more difficult political challenges than a tax credit193
because tax credits have “much lower visibility than a direct
spending program . . . [and the credit is] hidden in the tax
code.”194
As tax law can be difficult for the public to understand, most
politicians avoid political backlash for their votes on tax

191. See O’Shea, supra note 112 (explaining that the companies that
invest enough to establish strong artificial intelligence and a healthy
environment for content moderators will be in the best position to have a safe
website for users).
192. Kesan & Shah, supra note 167, at 380–81 (“Commonly, justifications
of government intervention are based on a form of market failure.”).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 381 (“[A] tax expenditure is still government spending;
virtually any tax expenditure provision could be rewritten in the form of a
direct spending program.”).
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credits.195 Dan T. Coenen explained the benefit to politicians of
the difficulty of tax law to understand by stating:
Most people view tax structures (especially tax
structures applicable to corporations and other
businesses) as an esoteric specialty beyond their
capabilities and willingness to understand. A
failure to understand breeds a failure to secondguess, and a failure to second-guess implies that
tax structures will, more readily than monetary
subsidies, escape political opposition.196
A subsidy for website operators to incentivize investment in
content moderation could generate a negative viewpoint as the
public may not like Facebook and other billion-dollar
corporations receiving direct subsidies from taxpayer dollars.197
Politicians will face less risk pursuing a tax credit,198 and with
both political parties expressing interest in improving § 230,199
a tax credit is politically safer than a direct subsidy.
Tax deductions as a solution for website operators would
also be insufficient, as it would not provide enough of an
incentive for website operators to invest in content moderation.
A company may deduct any “ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business.”200 Companies list content moderation costs under
“Operating Expenses,” as R&D, until the content moderation
system is fully implemented, where it would then be part of the
“cost of revenue.”201 A company can deduct these expenses from

195. Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 992 (1998).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 993 (“Subsidies may be looked upon more unfavorably because
they are symptomatic of large and meddlesome government, while tax
exemptions seem to comport with limited government and the value of private
initiative.”).
198. See id. at 994; Kesan & Shah, supra note 167, at 381 (citation
omitted) (“[M]any politicians who regard themselves as fiscally conservative
would rather use a tax expenditure than support another ‘big government
spending program’ — a key component to the popularity of tax expenditures.”).
199. See Gillette, supra note 24.
200. I.R.C. § 162(a).
201. Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 51, 59, 60 (Aug. 1, 2019).
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its net income as an “ordinary and necessary [business]
expense,”202 and they should be able to keep deducting content
moderation expenses, but an additional tax credit will lift a huge
financial burden off of these companies. Twitter and Microsoft
acknowledged that investing in content moderation will require
“significant costs” and time and may also lead to a reduction in
revenues for website operators.203 We want to incentivize
investment in content moderation, not intimidate website
operators with overwhelming costs.
In this hypothetical example, Company A had $1,000 in
revenue for the taxable year, and $100 in content moderation
costs.204 If the content moderation costs are a tax deduction as
an “ordinary and necessary expense,”205 Company A would
deduct the $100 in content moderation costs from the $1,000 in
revenue, resulting in the company having $900 for its adjusted
gross income.206 Assuming there were no other possible
deductions, Company A would have a Net Taxable Income of
$900. If the hypothetical tax rate were twenty percent,
Company A would have to pay $180 in taxes to the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”).207
If Company A’s content moderation costs were a tax credit,
rather than a tax deduction, Company A would have no
deductions, and $1,000 in Net Taxable Income. With the
hypothetical tax rate of twenty percent, Company A would have
a Gross Tax of $200. But as a tax credit, the content moderation
costs would be subtracted from the Gross Tax, making it a
dollar-for-dollar reduction in Company A’s tax bill.208 Therefore,

202. I.R.C. § 162(a).
203. Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Aug. 1, 2019);
Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 20, 2019).
204. Assume for this example that there are no other expenses and
deductions that need to be implemented.
205. I.R.C. § 162(a).
206. JOEL S. NEWMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CASES, PROBLEMS,
AND MATERIALS 4–6 (7th ed. 2019). The formula for calculating the tax bill
owed to the IRS, in general, is: Gross Revenue minus Deductions equals Net
Taxable Income. The Net Taxable Income multiplied by the applicable tax rate
results in the Gross Tax. The Gross Tax minus Credits and Prepayments
equals the amount owed to the IRS or the refund the taxpayer will receive. See
id.
207. See id.
208. See Tina Orem, Tax Credits Save You More than Deductions: Here
Are the Best Ones, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2017, 1:07 PM),
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Company A’s $100 in content moderation costs would be
subtracted from its Gross Tax of $200, leaving Company A with
a tax bill of $100 due to the IRS. The content moderation costs
as a tax deduction only reduced Company A’s tax bill by $20,209
but when used as a tax credit, Company A reduced its tax bill by
$100. While tax credits are a “dollar-for-dollar reduction in your
actual tax bill,” a deduction just lowers the taxable income.210
Section 230 has maintained its importance mostly because
of cost. The concerns over endless liability without § 230
continue,211 and now we must consider the resources companies
will need to improve content moderation into the cost analysis.
Section 230, in maintaining its present condition, will give
companies time to implement their content moderation
strategies, and a tax credit will help ensure the companies have
capital to take on the investment.212 This would help companies
avoid the question of whether to invest in content moderation
because it is the right thing to do, or to maintain profitability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Congress states that one of the many reasons it enacted §
230 was “to remove disincentives for the development and
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies . . . to restrict .
. . access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.”213
While removing disincentives benefits companies, we must
prioritize creating incentives for these companies to invest the
time and resources towards content moderation. Congress has

https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2017/03/28/taxes-taxcredits-deductions-refund-irs/99723100/.
209. If there were no content moderation costs, Company A would have
had a Net Taxable Income of $1,000. Company A’s Net Taxable Income
multiplied by the hypothetical twenty percent tax rate would have imposed a
$200 tax bill on Company A.
210. Orem, supra note 208.
211. Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Bos., 386 F. Supp. 3d 113, 122 (D. Mass. 2019)
(citing Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016)) (“Congress’[]
desire [was] to ‘allow[] website operators to engage in blocking and screening
of third-party content, free from liability for such good-faith efforts.’”).
212. See Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 20, 2019)
(noting that the company will need to devote a significant amount of time and
resources to implement a strong content moderation strategy).
213. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4).
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been known to lag in regulating the private sector.214 That must
change. There is a common goal between Congress, companies,
and the public to make websites safer. If Congress enacts a tax
credit for companies that invest in content moderation, that
benefit will spur investment in content moderation, which will
help establish a safer internet for the public. The times of
scaring website operators with liability must end, and the
solution must reside in collaboration.

214. Griffith, supra note 147 (“[T]he law is at least five years behind
developing a technology.”).
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